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I. STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an unemployment compensation case. 
It. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On March 24, 2009, the Appeals Examiner of the ldaho Department of Labor 
issued his Decision that Respondent, Mark W. Mussman (hereinafter "Mussman") was 
discharged for misconduct in connection with his employment by his employer, 
Appellant, Kootenai County (hereinafter "Kootenai County"). R. 1. On April 17, 2009, 
Mussman timely filed his Notice of Filing Appeal of the Decision of the Appeals 
Examiner to the ldaho Industrial Commission. R. 10. On June 4, 2009, the ldaho 
lndustrial Commission issued its Decision and Order, reversing the Decision of the 
Appeals Examiner. R. 48. On July 13, 2009, Kootenai County timely filed its Notice of 
Appeal of the Decision and Order of the Industrial Commission to the ldaho Supreme 
Court. R. 57. 
Ill. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mussman was hired by Kootenai County on August 27, 2001, and worked as a 
Planner I l l  in the Building and Planning Department from December of 2005 until he 
was discharged on October 15, 2008. Tr. p. 5, LI, 16-23; p. 6, LI. 4-5. 
In March 2007, Mussman received a corrective action from his prior supervisor, 
the interim Building and Planning Director at that time, who directed that Mussman must 
review all interpretations of County ordinances and policy decisions with the Director of 
the Building and Planning Department and with legal counsel for the County prior to 
implementation. Tr. p. 7, LI. 1-12; p. 13, LI. 20-25, p. 14, LI. 1-6. Mussman received the 
corrective action, but he refused to sign. Tr. p. 8, Li. 3-7. Mussman does acknowledge 
that he was subject to the requirement that interpretations of County ordinances and 
policy decisions must be approved by the Director of the Building and Planning 
Department, and by legal counsel prior to submitting to the public. Tr. p. 77, LI. 10-25. 
Kootenai County has a standard of conduct policy which describes certain 
infractions which may lead to discipline, up to and including termination, including 
insubordination or refusal to comply with instructions or failure to perform reasonable 
duties which are assigned, and conduct which reflects adversely on the County. Tr. p. 
7, LI. 13-21. Mussman received and signed for a copy of Kootenai County's Personnel 
Policy Manual. Tr. p. 7, LI. 22-25. 
On August 8, 2008, the Director of the Building and Planning Department issued 
a written administrative interpretation of County ordinance regarding setback issues for 
a specific project ("Graham Project"). Tr. p. 24, LI. 11-13. That written administrative 
interpretation was copied to Mussman. Tr. p. 24, LI. 13-25. On August 11, 2008, 
Mussman and the Director of the Building and Planning Department met to discuss the 
Graham Project and the Director's interpretation. Tr. p. 25, LI. 6-9; p. 26, LI. 17-25; p. 
27, Li. 1-3. Mussman acknowledged that the Director's decision regarding the 
ordinance interpretation and its application to the Graham Project was final. Tr. p. 26, 
LI. 21-23; p. 27, Ll. 3-5. 
On August 28, 2008, at the request of the property developer, Graham, 
Mussman executed an affidavit interpreting the same County ordinance and its 
application to the Graham Project. Tr. p. 11, LI. 4-13; Tr. p. 20, LI. 4-8. The affidavit 
executed by Mussman, which was for the benefit of Graham, describes interpretations 
of County ordinance, which Mussman describes as prior interpretations that conflict with 
the Director's current interpretations concerning the Graham Project, but in any event 
knowingly undermined and compromised the position of the Building and Planning 
Director of Kootenai County. Tr. p. 18, LI. 11-16; Tr. p. 25, LI. 7-13. The affidavit was 
executed without the knowledge or approval of the Director or legal counsel for 
Kootenai County. Tr. p. 25, LI. 13-15; p. 18, LI. 6-8 
Mussman was 'discharged on October 14, 2008, for executing the affidavit on 
behalf of Graham, which provided interpretations of County ordinances, historical or 
otherwise, for making a statement asserting what the Director knew or didn't know, 
without review and approval of the Director and legal counsel for the County, which 
knowingly compromised and undermined the position of the Director and Kootenai 
County. Tr. p. 25, LI. 9-24. 
IV. ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Whether the Industrial Commission erred in its Decision and Order 
dated June 4, 2009, finding that Kootenai County's discharge of 
Mussman was not for misconduct in connection with his 
employment, which reversed the Decision of the Appeals Examiner 
entered on March 24,2009. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
The Supreme Court freely reviews questions of law in an appeal from a decision 
of the Industrial Commission, disturbing findings of fact on appeal only where they are 
not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Johnson v. ldaho Cent. Credit 
Union, 127 ldaho 867, 870, 908 P.2d 560, 563 (1995) (citations and quotations omitted). 
"[Wlhere the evidence is presented without substantial conflict, a question of law is 
presented to this Court as to whether or not it will support the conclusion reached by the 
Industrial Commission." Id., citing Ortiz v. Armour and Co., 100 ldaho 363, 364, 597 
P.2d 606, 607 (1979) (quofing in Re Pacific Nat. Life Assur. Co., 70 ldaho 98, 212 P.2d 
397 (1 949)). 
In ldaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 ldaho 257, 715 P.2d 927 (1985), the 
Court discussed the test for determining what constitutes substantial competent 
evidence for the purpose of judicial review of an administrative agency's action 
"In Local 1494 of the International Association of Firefiahters v. City of 
Coeur d'Alene, 99 ldaho 630, 586 P.2d 1346 (1978), this Court discussed 
the test for determining what constitutes substantial evidence for the 
purposes of judicial review of an administrative agency's action. We 
observed: 
The "substantial evidence rule" is said to be a "middle position" which 
precludes a de novo hearing but which nonetheless requires a serious 
review which goes beyond the mere ascertainment of procedural 
regularity. Id. at 633, 586 P.2d at 1349. 
Such a review requires more than a mere "scintilla" of evidence in support 
of the agency's determination, id. at 634, 586 P.2d at 1350, though 
"something less than the weight of the evidence." Consolo v. FMC, 383 
U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 101 8, 1026, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1 966). "Put simply," 
we wrote, "the substantial [competent] evidence rule requires a court to 
determine 'whether [the agency's] findings of fact are reasonable.' 4 Davis, 
Administrative Law Text § 29.01-02 at 525-530." Local 1494, supra, 99 
Idaho at 634, 586 P.2d at 1350; see also Universal Camera Corp. v. 
National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 459, 95 
L.Ed. 456 (1951) (Substantial evidence is " 'such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' 
Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197, 
229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126.") (cited with approval in Local 1494, 
supra). 
In deciding whether the agency's findings of fact were reasonable, 
reviewing courts should not "read only one side of the case and, if they 
find any evidence there," sustain the administrative action and ignore the 
record to the contrary. Universal Camera, supra, 340 U.S. at 481, 71 S.Ct. 
at 460; quoted in Local 1494, supra, 99 ldaho at 634, 586 P.2d at 1350. 
Certainly reviewing courts should not "displace the [agency's] choice 
between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would 
justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de 
novo." Universal Camera, supra, 340 U.S. at 488, 71 S.Ct. at 464; accord, 
Swisher, supra, 98 ldaho at 570, 569 P.2d at 915; Aiax Paving Industries, 
lnc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 713 F.2d 1214, 1217 (6th 
Cir.1983) ("In conducting its review for substantial evidence the appellate 
court is not to substitute its own view of the evidence for that of the 
[agency]...."); cf. I.C. 3 67-5215(g) ("The court shall not substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on 
questions of fact."). Nevertheless, reviewing courts should evaluate 
whether "the evidence supporting that decision [under review] is 
substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety 
furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the [agency's] view." 
Universal Camera, supra, 340 U.S. at 488, 71 S.Ct. at 464; quoted in 
Local 1494, supra, 99 ldaho at 634, 586 P.2d at 1350; accord, Local One, 
Amalgamated Lithographers v. National Labor Relations Board, 729 F.2d 
172, 175 (2d Cir.1984). 
Reviewing courts should not automatically reject an agency finding of fact 
that is supported by substantial competent evidence "merely because the 
5 
agency also incidentally mentions incompetent or irrelevant material." 
Braniff Airwavs, lnc. v. CAB, 379 F.2d 453, 466 (D.C.Cir.1967); quoted in 
Consolidated Gas Supply v. Federal Enerqy Regulatory Commission, 606 
F.2d 323, 329 (D.C.Cir.1979), cert. den. 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1018, 
62 L.Ed.2d 755. If this happens, "[tjhe appropriate standard is to remand 
for correction of an error only when there is substantial doubt that the 
administrative agency would have reached the result it did absent 
reference to the material. [Citations.]" Consolidated Gas, supra, 606 F.2d 
at 329." 
Id. at 260-61, 715 P.2d at 930-31 
B. The Industrial Commission erred in determining Mussman was 
not discharged for misconduct in his employment. 
Unemployment benefits are not available to an employee "discharged from his 
conduct in connection with his employment." ldaho Code § 72-1366(5). Misconduct in 
connection with employment means: 
1. A willful, intentional disregard of the employer's interest; 
2. A deliberate violation of the employer's reasonable rules; or, 
3. A disregard of the standards of behavior which the employer 
has a right to expect of his or her employees. 
Smith v. Zero Defects, Inc., 132 ldaho 881, 884, 980 P.2d 545, 548 (1999); Kivalu v. 
Life Care Centers of America, 142 ldaho 262, 264, 127 P.3d 165, 167 (2005); IDAPA 
09.01.30.275.02. "The Commission must consider all three grounds to determine if 
there has been misconduct." Smith, 132 ldaho at 548, 980 P.2d at 884; Dietz v. 
Minidoka County Hiahway Dist., 127 ldaho 246, 248, 899 P.2d 956, 958 (1995). 
The test for misconduct in standard of behavior cases is as follows: (1) Whether 
the employee's conduct fell below the standard of behavior expected by the employer; 
and, (2) Whether the employer's expectation was objectively reasonable in the 
particular case. Smith, 132 Idaho at 884, 980 P.2d at 548. The employee's disregard of 
a standard of behavior need not be subjectively intentional or deliberate. Id. 
I) Standard of Behavior. 
The Industrial Commission's finding that "there is no evidence of a specific policy 
stating that affidavits must be approved by the director," was in error. R. 51. Mussman 
clearly acknowledges that interpretations of County ordinance must be approved by the 
Director and the County's legal counsel. Tr. p. 17, LI. 16-25. The lndustrial 
Commission found that although the Director read into the record the corrective action 
plan requiring Mussman to have all interpretations reviewed by the Director and 
Kootenai County's legal counsel, Mussman "testified that he was never told, either in 
writing or verbally, that he needed prior approval by the Director or the legal 
department." R. 52. No evidence supports the lndustrial Commission's finding, 
Mussman testified that "interpretations of the language of the ordinance, especially 
major ones that were questionable, had to be run through the Director, and typically it 
was run through the entire staff, and if there were still questions, run by legal counsel." 
Tr. p. 17, LI. 22-25. As such, the industrial Commission's finding is not supported by 
any evidence and thereby is in error. 
The Commission further erred with its finding that the corrective plan, written by 
the previous Interim Director, requiring that Mussman review all interpretations with the 
Director or legal counsel prior to submitting to the public, constitutes little to no weight 
based upon the best evidence rule, in that a hard copy was not entered into evidence. 
However, neither Mussman nor the hearing examiner objected or requested a hard 
copy of any documents during the hearing. Again, Mussman acknowledges that the 
corrective action plan required that Mussman have all interpretations reviewed by the 
Director and the County's legal counsel prior to submitting to the public. Tr. p. 17, LI. 
10-25. 
The Industrial Commission, in essence, is requiring a heightened standard of 
evidence not contemplated by the rules, which is unjust and prejudicial. The Appeals 
Examiner and the lndustrial Commission "may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, 
unduly repetitious, or excludable on constitutional or statutory grounds, or on the basis 
of any evidentiary privilege provided by statute or recognized in the courts of this state. 
All other evidence may be admitted if it is of a type commonly relied upon by prudent 
persons in the conduct of their affairs." IDAPA 09.01.06.026.13; Hiqains v. Larw Miller 
Subaru-Mitsubishi, 145 Idaho 1, 5, 175 P.3d 163, 167 (2007). 
The Appeals Examiner functions as a fact finder and decision maker. "The 
appeals examiner will function as a fact finder and not solely as a judge. The appeals 
examiner will have the responsibility of developinq all the evidence that is reasonably 
available." IDAPA 09.01.06.026.1 1 (emphasis added). The Appeals Examiner, in its 
role of fact finder, directs the order of the witnesses and developed the evidence. "The 
appeals examiner will direct the order of witnesses and develop evidence in a logical 
and orderly manner to move the hearing along as expeditiously as possible." IDAPA 
09.01.06.026.12. 
As discussed above, neither Mussman nor the Appeals Examiner requested or 
objected to the documents in which the Director read into the record, nor were any 
additional documents requested to be produced. If any of the parties had objected or 
requested such, the County could have and would have supplemented the record when 
the record was open. However, the Industrial Commission's apparent heightened 
evidentiary standard, raised for the first time after the record was closed, is prejudicial 
and unfair to the County, in that the County had no opportunity to respond when the 
record was open. 
The Industrial Commission has the authority and obligation to develop the 
evidence when justice so requires and the evidence is reasonably available. "Where 
unsatisfactory evidence is furnished by a party claiming unemployment compensation 
benefits, the same rule applies as in workmen's compensation cases. That is, the board 
should make further and individual investigation and, to that end, may subpoena and 
examine other witnesses than those furnished by claimant." Hasadone v. Kirkpatrick, 66 
ldaho 55, 57 154 P.2d 181, 182 (1944); Feuling v. Farmers' Co-op. Ditch Co., 54 ldaho 
326, 334, 31 P.2d 683,686 (1934); Hartman v. Double L Mfq., 141 ldaho 456, 458, 11 1 
P.3d 141, 143 (2005). 
In other contexts, the ldaho Supreme Court has held that it was error for the 
lndustrial Commission to refuse to admit into evidence a witness reading a document 
into evidence. See Haqler v. Micron Technoloqy, Inc., 118 ldaho 596, 598-99, 798 P.2d 
55, 57-58 (1990) (There was no reason for the industrial Commission to strike testimony 
and readings from the medical treatise, or for the Commission to refuse to admit the 
treatise into evidence). Strict adherence to the rules of evidence is not required in 
Industrial Commission proceedings, and admission of evidence in such proceedings is 
more relaxed. w, 118 ldaho at 598, 798 P.2d at 57. "The Legislature, when it 
created the Commission, intended that proceedings before it be as summary, 
economical and simple as the rules of equity would allow." Hite v. Kulhenak Bldq. 
Contractor, 96 ldaho 70, 72, 524 P.2d 531, 533 (1974). In fact, in the case the 
Industrial Commission cited for the applicability of the best evidence rule to 
administrative hearings, DiLucente Cow. v. Pennsylvania Prevailinq Waqe Appeals Bd., 
692 A.2d 295, 298 (1997), that court noted that the claimant was making a best 
evidence rule argument, "which is a technical rule of evidence not generally applicable 
to administrative hearings." Thus, the lndustrial Commission's findings that "it cannot 
determine by a preponderance of evidence that [Mussman] was aware that he needed 
prior approval for affidavits regarding interpretations" is clearly in error. R. 53. Mussman 
specifically acknowledged that he was required to follow such a rule or policy. Tr. 17, LI. 
20-25. The apparent heightened evidentiary standard by the lndustrial Commission, 
after the evidentiary record was closed, is not contemplated by the law, and is 
prejudicial to Kootenai County. 
Kootenai County has a policy against insubordination or refusal to comply with 
instructions or failure to perform reasonable duties which are assigned and against 
conduct which reflects adversely on the County. Tr. p. 7, LI. 15-21. Mussman was 
aware of such policy and signed for such. Tr. p. 7, 11. 22-25. Mussman was also aware 
of the prior corrective action requiring that interpretations of County ordinance must be 
reviewed or approved by the Director and legal counsel prior to submitting to the public. 
Tr. p. 17, LI. 20-25. Mussman signed an affidavit describing interpretations which he 
describes as historical, but nevertheless, interpretations inconsistent with the Director's 
stated interpretation. Tr. p. 11, LI. 4-13. Mussman knew that the Director's decision on 
the interpretation was final. Tr. p. 26, LI. 21-23; p. 27, LI. 4-5. Moreover, the affidavit 
describing the inconsistent interpretations cannot be said, in any manner, that it was for 
the benefit of the County, but only served to undermine the decision of the Director. Tr. 
p. 25, LI. 6-24. Kootenai County had a reasonable expectation that Mussman would not 
execute affidavits containing interpretations of County ordinance, whether historical or 
not, but in any event which conflict with, compromise and undermine the decision of the 
Director of the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department. 
The Industrial Commission also erred when it concluded that Kootenai County's 
expectation was not adequately communicated or that his behavior fell below such 
expectation because Mussman had executed other affidavits providing interpretations 
without the Director or legal counsel's review and approval, and was not disciplined. R. 
53. However, Mussman testified that he did not make the Director aware that he had 
executed any of these other affidavits. Tr. p. 22, LI. 16-20. Thus, the County could not 
have disciplined Mussman for something in which they were not aware. As such, the 
lndustrial Commission erred in its finding that Mussman was not discharged for 
misconduct 
2) Willful, Intentional Disregard of Employee's Interest. 
Mussman's conduct constitutes a willful, intentional disregard of Kootenai 
County's interest. The lndustrial Commission found that the interpretation by Mussman 
was not a new interpretation, but was merely provided the developer, Graham, an 
affidavit describing prior interpretations of the ordinance as applied to the Graham 
Project, and therefore does not constitute misconduct. The Director read into the record 
an excerpt of the affidavit executed by Mussman: 
In number six you [Mussman] wrote previously I (Mussman] and other 
members of the staff, at the request of Mr. Graham and his designated 
team, agreed to the property line setback measured as follows. This is 
an interpretation consistent with - and it goes on. 
Tr. p. I I , LI 9-1 3 (emphasis added). 
Well, under number seven you [Mussman] wrote - it begins - this is an 
interpretation consistent with - and, then, it goes on. 
Tr. p. 11, LI 4-6 (emphasis added). As discussed above, neither Mussman nor the 
Appeals Examiner objected to or requested a hard copy of the affidavit. Mussman 
describes his statements as merely describing, for the benefit of the developer Graham, 
prior interpretations which conflict with the Director's current interpretation. Mussman 
willfully executed the affidavit after meeting with the Director on the matter and was 
instructed and acknowledged that the Director's decision regarding the interpretation 
- 
and application to the Graham Project was final. l r. p. 26, i l .  22, 23; p. 27, i l .  4-5. 
Mussman's conduct only served to benefit the property developer, Graham, and willfully 
undermined Kootenai County and the Building and Planning Director's decision. 
In the unemployment benefits context, the Supreme Court has previously defined 
intentional insubordination as "a deliberate or willful refusal by an employee to obey a 
reasonable order or directive which an employer is authorized to give and entitled to 
have obeyed." Whittier v. Department of Health & Welfare, 137 Idaho 75, 79, 44 P.3d 
1130, 1134 (2002). (citations omitted). "Insubordination is also defined as "willful or 
intentional disregard of the lawful and reasonable instructions of the employer." Id. 
(citing Black's Law Dictionary 801(61h Ed. 1990). 
Again, Mussman executed the affidavit, at the request and for the benefit of 
Graham, which described interpretations of a County ordinance, or as Mussman 
describes, as merely prior interpretations that conflict with the Director's current 
interpretations concerning the Graham Project. Tr. p. 18, LI. 11-16; Tr. p. 25, LI. 7-13. 
Mussman's conduct constitutes a deliberate or willful refusal to obey the County's 
directive prohibiting such. As discussed above, Kootenai County was clearly authorized 
to require that Mussman obtain prior approval from the Director before executing an 
affidavit on behalf of a developer which contains interpretations, historical or otherwise, 
but which nonetheless are inconsistent with the Director's interpretation, and which 
undermine and compromise's the position of Kootenai County and the Building and 
Planning Director. Additionally, Kootenai County had the right to expect that Mussman 
would not execute an affidavit on behalf of a developer which negatively reflects on 
Kootenai County and the Building and Planning Director. As such, the Industrial 
Commission erred in its finding that Mussman was not discharged for misconduct. 
3) Deliberate Violation of the Employer's Reasonable Rules. 
The lndustrial Commission erred when it failed to address whether Mussman's 
conduct constituted a deliberate violation of Kootenai County's reasonable rules. R. 51. 
The Industrial Commission is required to address all three grounds to determine if there 
is misconduct. Smith, 132 Idaho at 548, 980 P.2d at 884. Again, Mussman 
acknowledges that interpretations of County ordinance must be presented to the 
Director and/or the County's legal staff prior to submission to the public. Tr. p. 17, LI. 
20-25. Additionally, Mussman failed to submit any evidence or objection to the County's 
policy against insubordination for refusal to comply with instructions, or failure to 
perform reasonable duties which are assigned, or conduct which reflects adversely on 
the County. Tr. p. 7, LI. 18-21. As discussed above, these rules are objectively 
reasonable. Mussman's conduct in executing an affidavit on behalf of, and in support of 
Graham, the property developer's position, which was knowingly inconsistent with the 
Building and Planning Director's interpretation and position, and which asserted what 
the Director knew or didn't know, without any review or authorization of the Director, 
was in violation of the County's rules. As such, Mussman's behavior constitutes 
misconduct, and the Industrial Commission erred in failing to address whether 
Mussman's conduct constitutes a deliberate violation of the County's reasonable rules. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that the Decision of the 
Industrial Commission be reversed and the matter be remanded. 
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